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Abstract
Recent work has shown that visual fixations reflect and influence trial-to-trial variability in people’s
preferences between goods. Here we extend this principle to attribute weights during decision making
under risk. We measured eye movements while people chose between two risky gambles or bid on a
single gamble. Consistent with previous work, we found that people exhibited systematic preference
reversals between choices and bids. For two gambles matched in expected value, people systematically
chose the higher probability option but provided a higher bid for the option that offered the greater
amount to win. This effect was accompanied by a shift in fixations of the two attributes, with people
fixating on probabilities more during choices and on amounts more during bids. Our results suggest that
the construction of value during decision making under risk depends on task context partly because the
task differentially directs attention at probabilities vs. amounts. Since recent work demonstrates that
neural correlates of value vary with visual fixations, our results also suggest testable hypotheses
regarding how task context modulates the neural computation of value to generate preference reversals.
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Recent work has shown that visual fixations reflect and influence trial-to-trial variability in
people’s preferences between goods. Here we extend this principle to attribute weights
during decision making under risk. We measured eye movements while people chose
between two risky gambles or bid on a single gamble. Consistent with previous work, we
found that people exhibited systematic preference reversals between choices and bids.
For two gambles matched in expected value, people systematically chose the higher probability option but provided a higher bid for the option that offered the greater amount to
win. This effect was accompanied by a shift in fixations of the two attributes, with people
fixating on probabilities more during choices and on amounts more during bids. Our results
suggest that the construction of value during decision making under risk depends on task
context partly because the task differentially directs attention at probabilities vs. amounts.
Since recent work demonstrates that neural correlates of value vary with visual fixations,
our results also suggest testable hypotheses regarding how task context modulates the
neural computation of value to generate preference reversals.
Keywords: anchoring, context effects, contingent weighting, eye-tracking, neuroeconomics, risk aversion, visual
attention

INTRODUCTION
A challenge for theories of decision making under risk is to account
for known systematic inconsistencies in people’s decisions. An
example is the “preference reversal phenomenon,” which involves
systematic inconsistencies between preferences and prices (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, 1973; Grether and Plott, 1979). Preference
reversals were initially demonstrated by Lichtenstein and Slovic
(1971). When given a choice between two gambles of similar
expected value (EV), one with a high probability of winning a
smaller amount of money (termed the P-bet) and another with
a low probability of winning a larger amount (termed the $-bet),
most people choose the higher probability P-bet. However, when
providing selling prices for the same exact gambles, most people assign a higher price to the larger amount $-bet. These two
decisions appear to be mutually inconsistent. The P-bet cannot
be simultaneously better than and worse than the $-bet, and one
would expect people to demand a higher price for their preferred
gamble. Preference reversals violate the principle of procedure
invariance, whereby preferences should not change depending on
how they are measured (Tversky et al., 1990; Stalmeier et al., 1997).
Despite its apparent irrationality, the preference reversal phenomenon is remarkably robust. For specifically designed alternatives, the frequency of reversals can be greater than 50% (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973; Grether and Plott, 1979; Tversky et al.,
1990). The basic inconsistency has been replicated numerous times
by psychologists and experimental economists, including under
different designs using non-gamble stimuli and various incentive mechanisms (Mowen and Gentry, 1980; Tversky et al., 1990;
Mellers et al., 1992a,b). Further, preference reversals persist in the
face of large incentives (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1973; Grether and
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Plott, 1979), including when the experimenter exploits the inconsistency to take money from the subject (Berg et al., 1985; Chu and
Chu, 1990).
Various explanations have been proposed for preference reversals, which attribute the reversal to changes at different stages of
the decision process. Different theories attribute preference reversals to changes in how attributes are weighted (Tversky et al.,
1988), changes in how weighted attributes are combined to form an
evaluation (e.g., additive vs. multiplicative combination; Mellers
et al., 1992b), or changes in how a formed evaluation is expressed,
or translated into a response, in different tasks (Goldstein and
Einhorn, 1987). Though conceptually distinct, changes at these
different stages are also not mutually exclusive.
A prominent explanation for preference reversals is Tversky
et al. (1988) contingent weighting hypothesis. They argue that
attribute weights are closer to lexicographic (i.e., closer to all-ornone) in choice compared to other tasks, which leads to the most
important attribute being weighted even more heavily in choice,
a phenomena called the prominence effect (Slovic, 1975; Tversky
et al., 1988). Since most people are risk-averse (Holt and Laury,
2002), weighting probability more than amount, this would lead
to the probability dimension being weighted even more in choice
than other decision tasks (Note there is some debate, though, about
whether the prominence effect occurs for gambles; see Tversky
et al., 1988, p. 382). By contrast, Tversky et al. (1988) argue that
the payoff dimension is weighted more during bids because of the
compatibility effect, whereby attributes that are compatible with
the output are given more weight (in this case, payoff is compatible with bids, since both are in dollars; Slovic, 1975; Tversky
et al., 1988). Formally, Tversky et al. (1988) model the change in
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responses across the two tasks as a change in the weight αi (where
i = choice, bid) of the following utility function for a gamble to
win amount a with probability p:

U p, a = log p + αi log a
Note that this is simply the logarithmic transform of an expected
utility (EU) model in which the degree of risk aversion varies
between choices and bids.
Here, using visual fixations as an index of information processing and visual attention, we sought to determine what information
people attend to during a preference reversal paradigm. Specifically, we aimed to test whether visual fixations reflect changes
in the weighting of different attributes, with people looking at
probability information more during choices and amount information more during bids. Since preference reversals could be due
to changes at different stages of the decision process, this finding
would also provide additional support for contingent weighting
being at least part of the explanation.
This experiment also builds on recent research linking visual
fixations and preferences. Rangel and colleagues have shown that
visual fixations both reflect and influence preferences between
goods (Armel et al., 2008; Krajbich et al., 2009, 2010). Visual fixations also modulate the neural correlates of preferences, with
activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum
reflecting the value of the fixated item compared to the value of
item not fixated (Lim et al., 2011). Here we test whether the link
between fixations and preferences generalizes to decision making
under risk, and whether fixations are further linked to attribute
weights. Given the link between fixations and neural correlates of
preferences, this evidence should also inform theorizing regarding
the specific neural signals that might be modulated by task context
to give rise to preference reversals.
Our investigation follows previous process tracing studies by
Johnson et al. (1988) and Schkade and Johnson (1988). Using
Mouselab, they found that individuals spent proportionally more
time looking at probability information during choices than during bidding. However, Mouselab may not always provide the
most natural decision environment (Lohse and Johnson, 1996). In
Mouselab, subjects acquire information by positioning a mouse
cursor over different windows, and the pattern of mouse movements is recorded. This can increase the amount of effort needed
to acquire information, which can then alter the information
processing behavior of subjects (Lohse and Johnson, 1996). Eyetracking does not have this problem. Since eye-tracking does not
impose additional requirements on subjects to obtain or maintain
information, it might in some cases provide a more sensitive or
more accurate measure of information processing. For this reason, as well as to build on recent work linking visual fixations and
preferences, we thought it was important to further investigate
preference reversals using eye-tracking techniques.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS

Twenty-six paid volunteers from the University of Pennsylvania
community participated in this study. Data from two participants were discarded because their responses suggested confusion
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regarding the bidding task. One participant’s bids were not positively correlated with EV, and the other participant bid higher than
the amount to win in several gambles. The mean age of our final
sample (N = 24) was 23.6 years (age range: 19–29 years), and 52%
were female. All participants gave written informed consent in
accordance with the procedures of the Institutional Review Board
at the University of Pennsylvania.
TASKS AND STIMULI

On each trial, subjects either made a choice between two gambles
(choice trials) or provided their evaluation of a single gamble (bid
trials, see Figure 1). On choice trials, subjects chose between two
different gambles with varying probabilities (12–95%) of winning
different amounts of money ($10–$98). On bid trials, subjects
entered their subjective evaluation of a gamble in dollar amounts.
At the end of each session, one trial was randomly selected, and
participants were paid according to their decision on that trial. If
subjects won money, they received that money in addition to the
show-up fee of $10.
We used E-Prime to present all behavioral stimuli (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Subjects entered their
responses using a keyboard. Subjects were presented with a total
of 100 bid trials and 100 choice trials in eight alternating blocks of
25 trials each. In case placement of the probabilities and amounts
biased decision making, half the subjects saw the amounts as the
top number and the other half saw the probabilities as the top
number. All subjects saw the same set of gambles in the same
order. During a choice trial, subjects were presented with a screen
with the word “Choose” for one second. They then saw a screen
with two gambles side-by-side and had unlimited time to choose
between the two gambles. Subjects pressed “1” to choose the gamble on the left side of the screen and pressed “0” to choose the
gamble on the right. During a bid trial, subjects were presented
with a screen with the word “Bid” for 1 s. They then saw a screen
with a single gamble and had unlimited time to enter their dollar bid. Subjects used the number keys to enter their bid and
submitted their response by pressing the “return” key. Once bids
were entered, subjects were unable to change their responses. Participants were instructed to bid the “smallest amount of money
(they) would be willing to exchange for the opportunity to play
the gamble.”
Subjects went through a training period in the beginning to
ensure understanding of the task. Subjects had two practice trials
for each of the trial types. On bid practice trials, subjects were
taken through a series of questions after they entered their bid.
These questions were used during training to ensure that subjects
understood the bidding task and could provide well-calibrated
bids. First, subjects were asked if they would forego playing out
the gamble to take a counteroffer that was $1 higher than their
bid. If they answered “no,” they were told they bid too low and
were asked to bid again. If subjects answered “yes,” they were then
asked if they would play out the gamble and forego taking a counteroffer $1 less than their bid. If they answered “no,” they were told
they bid too high and were asked to bid again. Subjects repeated
this process until they answered yes to both questions. These questions were only asked on practice trials, and were not included on
experimental trials.
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FIGURE 1 | Choice and bid tasks. The sequences of events within a trial for
both choice and bid trials are shown. For choice trials, subjects saw “Choose”
for 1 s. Subjects then saw two gambles, a $-bet gamble and a P-bet gamble.
Subjects had unlimited time to choose one of the gambles. After submitting
their response, subjects would see a check mark on the side of the chosen

In choice trials, one gamble had a high probability of winning
a small amount of money (termed the P-bet, e.g., 84% chance
of $20), and the other had a low probability of winning a larger
amount (termed the $-bet, e.g., 24% chance of $70). Fifty pairs
of P-bets (ranging from 70 to 95% chance of winning $10–$34)
and $-bets (ranging from 12 to 37% chance of winning $35–$98)
were selected so that the P-bet and $-bet were approximately equal
in EV, with differences ranging from $0.00 to $0.09 and a median
difference of $0.02. Probability ranges were chosen based on previous studies (e.g., Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971) and ensured
the ranges for P-bets and $-bets did not overlap. Amounts were
chosen to provide a reasonable range of EV, given that subjects
would be paid according to the outcome on a single trial. No
probability or dollar amount was used more than twice in the
stimulus set. This stimulus set was pre-tested in pilot behavioral
subjects (n = 12) who demonstrated a robust preference reversal
effect, and has now been used in several studies in our laboratory. To encourage participants to attend to each choice and avoid
following a simple heuristic (such as always choosing the higher
probability gamble), 10 of the 50 pairs were mismatched so that
either the P-bet or $-bet had a much higher EV. The EV across
all gamble pairs varied from $8.10 to $29.23, with a median of
$18.13. Each pair was presented twice during choice trials, with
the left-right placement of the gambles switching between presentations. The same gambles used in the choice task were shown
once individually in the bidding task. Thus for each subject we
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gamble. For bid trials, subjects saw “Bid” for 1 s. Subjects then saw one
gamble, either a $-bet or a P-bet gamble, on the left side of the screen. To the
right of the gamble was a “$” where subjects bids would appear. Subjects
had unlimited time to submit their bids. After submitting their response,
subjects would see the amount they bid.

have 100 choice and 100 bid trials where the stimulus on the
left of the screen is identical, and what differs is the presence
of another gamble or the bid prompt on the right side of the
screen.
Both tasks were administered in an incentive-compatible manner. At the end of the experiment, participants rolled dice to
randomly determine one bid or choice trial to be played out
for real money. If a choice trial was selected, participants were
given the opportunity to play the gamble that they chose, using
a 100-sided die to determine the outcome. For example, if the
chosen gamble was a 75% chance of winning $21, a roll of 75
or below on the die would pay $21 and a roll of 76 or above
would pay $0. If a bid trial was selected, participants were paid
using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) method, a widely
used incentive-compatible procedure (Becker et al., 1964). The
subject’s bid on the selected gamble was compared to a randomly
generated counteroffer (between $0 and the amount to win), created by dividing the roll of a 100-sided die by 100 and multiplying
the resulting fraction by the amount to win. If the subject’s bid was
higher than the counteroffer, the subject played the gamble. If the
subject’s bid was lower than the counteroffer, the subject received
the counteroffer amount. This method incentivizes participants to
bid their true valuation of the gamble, the amount at which they
would be indifferent between receiving their bid and playing the
gamble. The amount of money subjects won varied from $0 to
$37.41 with a median of $21.
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EYE-TRACKING

We used an Eyelink II head-mounted eye-tracker (SR Research
Ltd., Mississauga, ON, Canada) to monitor participant’s eye movements during the task. A camera imaged the participant’s right eye
at 250 Hz. Subjects sat approximately 1800 from the screen and
were calibrated using a 9-point calibration. To manage eye drift
and head movement, the subject fixated on a black dot at the center
of the screen after each trial and a drift correction measured how
much each subject’s measured gaze differed from the center of the
screen. The experimenter monitored drift corrections throughout
the whole experimental session and re-calibrated when the subject’s gaze drifted from the center. Eye movements were recorded
during each trial between the time of the first stimuli and the time
of the subject’s response.
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

We used Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) and SPSS (SPSS
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) to analyze our behavioral and eye-tracking
data. For each pair of gambles, we categorized responses in the
choice task according to whether the subjects chose the P-bet both
times (“chose P”), chose each bet once (“chose=”), or chose the
$-bet both times (“chose $”). Participants were consistent about
79% of the time, choosing the same gamble across both choices.
In the bid task, we categorized responses according to whether the
subject bid higher on the P-bet (“bid P”), bid equal amounts for
both bets (“bid=”), or bid higher on the $-bet (“bid $”). Within
the 40 gamble pairs matched in EV, we calculated two measures of
the preference reversal effect. One measure included all instances
of increasing preference for the $-bet (“weak P-to-$ reversals”),
that is, when subjects chose the P-bet both times then bid equal
amounts, when they chose each bet once then bid higher on the
$-bet, or when they chose the P-bet both times then bid higher
on the $-bet. The other measure included only this last category,
instances where the subject chose the P-bet twice and then bid
higher on the $-bet (“strict P-to-$ reversals”). We also calculated
two similar measures for reversals in the unpredicted direction,
from the $-bet in choice to the P-bet in bids.
In addition, we estimated a model in both tasks that assumed
subjects’ decisions were a function of the EU of the gambles:

EU p, a = p × a αi
Here αi (where i = choice, bid) is a measure of risk aversion. An
αi equal to one leads to risk-neutral decisions, an αi less than one
to risk-averse decisions, and an αi greater than one to risk-seeking
decisions. As mentioned in the introduction, one simple model of
contingent weighting is merely the logarithmic transform of this
equation (Tversky et al., 1988). From that perspective, an αi equal
to one means equal weighting, an αi less than one means probability is weighted more strongly, and an αi greater than one means
amount to win is weighted more strongly.
For choices, we fit a logistic regression that assumed choice
probabilities (cp) were a function of the difference in expected
utility between the two gambles:
cp (EU1 , EU2 ) =

1
1 + eβ(EU1 −EU2 )
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We fit this equation for each subject to his/her observed choices
using an iterative optimization in MATLAB (fminsearch and fminunc) to find the maximum likelihood estimate of αchoice and
β. The αchoice ’s of two subjects exceeded the boundaries that
our model could reliably estimate (0.17 < αchoice < 5.05), so we
excluded both α’s from these subjects from further analysis. For
bids, we fit a model that assumed the subject’s bid was equal to the
expected utility of the gamble, using non-linear least squares in
MATLAB. We obtained almost identical results to those reported
below if we fit αchoice and αbid using the logarithmic transform
of expected utility (i.e., the contingent weighting equation in the
introduction).
Response time was calculated as starting from the onset of
the stimuli and ending when the participant submitted their
responses.
Placement of the amounts and probabilities did not have any
significant effects on choice and bidding behavior (i.e., strict or
weak P-to-$ reversals, αchoice or αbid ). All ps > 0.10.
EYE TRACKING ANALYSIS

We used Data Viewer (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, ON, Canada)
for all pre-processing of the eye-tracking data and Matlab (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) for all eye-tracking analysis. The Eyelink
II software automatically parses eye movement data into fixations,
blinks, and saccades based on standard saccade thresholds (velocity
threshold = 30˚/s, acceleration threshold = 8000˚/s2 ). Only fixations initiated after the onset of the gambles were included in our
analyses. Additionally, the Eyelink on-line parser denoted a blink
when the pupil was very small, or when the eye-camera image of
the pupil was missing or severely distorted by eyelid occlusion.
We defined regions of interest (ROI) corresponding to each
amount and probability within each trial. The size of the screen
was 800 by 1200 pixels, and each ROI was approximately 280 by
320 pixels. There were four ROIs in choice trials, and two ROIs
during bid trials. For a controlled comparison between choice and
bid trials, we focused our analyses on only the two ROIs for the
left gamble in choice trials, since these were visually identical to
and contained the same amount of physical space as the two ROIs
in bid trials. For fixations and looking durations (but not first fixations), we observed the same pattern of results if we collapsed
across all four ROIs in choice trials.
We included three dependent variables in our eye-tracking
analyses: number of fixations, looking duration, and the first fixation of each trial. For each of our dependent variables, we ran an
ANOVA with gamble type (P-bets vs. $-bets), attribute (probability vs. amount), and trial type (choice vs. bids) as within-subject
factors and attribute placement (probability on top vs. amount on
top) as a between-subject factor. We refer to this ANOVA below as
our between-task analysis. To test subsequent comparisons within
a trial type, we ran separate ANOVAs for choice trials and bid trials
with gamble type (P-bets versus $-bets) and attribute (probability vs. amount) as within-subject factors and attribute placement
(probability on top vs. amount on top) as a between-subject factor.
We refer to these ANOVAs below as within-task analyses. These
analyses were all done using raw fixation numbers and looking
times, but we observed the same pattern of results if we examined
ratios of these variables (e.g., the ratio of fixations on probability
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versus amount, etc.). Fixations and looking durations for gamble
types and attribute were highly correlated. All rs > 0.92, ps < 001.
For fixations and looking durations (but not first fixations),
placement of the amounts and probabilities did not interact with the eye-tracking effects reported below. There was,
however, an interaction between attribute and attribute placement for all three dependent measures. Subjects had more
total fixations [mean = 5.69 ± 0.46 fixations vs. mean 4.77 ± 0.48
fixations; F (1, 22) = 33.37, p < 0.001], longer looking durations [mean = 1,718 ± 208 ms vs. mean = 1,337 ± 192 ms; F (1,
22) = 22.15, p < 0.001], and more first fixations [mean = 77 ± 3%
vs. mean = 23 ± 3%; F (1, 22) = 87.54, p < 0.001] for the attribute
that was presented on top.
Finally, to test for any effects of individual differences, we looked
at the correlation between each of our eye-tracking dependent
variables (proportion of total fixations and looking duration by
trial type and gamble type; proportion of total fixations, looking
duration, and first fixations by trial type and attribute) and each
of our behavioral variables (number of strict and weak P-to-$
reversals, αchoice and αbid ). This analysis excluded the two subjects whose choice alphas exceeded the boundaries that we could
reliably estimate (these two subjects were also outliers in terms
of the number of reversals, with neither making any weak P-to-$
A

1

reversals while the minimum among the remaining subjects was
22 weak reversals).

RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS

Overall, subjects spent more time on bid trials than on choice
trials. There was a significant increase in response times from
choice trials to bid trials, F (1, 23) = 74.95, p < 0.001. The average response time was 4,257 ± 549 ms during choice trials and
6,894 ± 485 ms during bid trials. [Note that, presumably secondary to this reaction time effect, there were also more total
fixations, F (1, 22) = 43.57, p < 0.001, and longer looking durations, F (1, 22) = 40.45, p < 0.001, during bid trials than during
choice trials.] Within bid trials, subjects took longer to bid on
$-bets than on P-bets, F (1, 23) = 31.43, p < 0.001. The average
response time for bids on P-bets was 6,381 ± 97 ms and the average
response time for $-bets 7,394 ± 101 ms.
Subjects also demonstrated a robust preference reversal effect.
During choice trials, subjects chose the P-bet significantly more
often than the $-bet, F (1, 23) = 34.02, p < 0.001. On average,
subjects chose the P-bet both times for 66 ± 13% of the pairs,
chose equally for 21 ± 4% of the pairs and chose the $-bet both
times for 13 ± 3% of the pairs (see Figure 2A). In contrast,
B
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Percentage of gamble pairs where subjects chose the P-bet
option twice (P), the $-bet twice ($), or both equally (=). On average, subjects
chose the P-bet significantly more than the $-bet. (B) Percentage of gamble
pairs where subjects bid higher for the P-bet option (P), $-bet option ($), or bid
the same amount for both gambles (=). On average, subjects bid higher on
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$-bets than on the P-bets. (C) Average alpha values for choice trials and bid
trials. Alphas were significantly higher for bidding than for choice. (D) The
average expected utility function for bids and choices given the inferred
alphas. Subjects were risk-averse during choices and slightly risk-seeking
during bids.
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subjects bid significantly higher on the $-bet than on the P-bet,
F (1, 23) = 18.22, p < 0.001. Subjects bid higher on the $-bet for
61 ± 13% of the pairs, bid the same on both gambles for 10 ± 2% of
the pairs, and bid higher on the P-bet for 28 ± 6% of the pairs (See
Figure 2B). Subjects preferred the P-bet significantly more often
when choosing than when bidding, F (1, 23) = 40.54, p < 0.001,
and preferred the $-bet significantly less often when choosing than
when bidding, F (1, 23) = 49.21, p < 0.001.
Across all gamble pairs, subjects exhibited increased preference for the $-bet in bids more often than the reverse effect, F (1,
23) = 104.37, p < 0.001. Subjects made weak P-to-$ reversals for
67 ± 5% of gamble pairs and weak $-to-P reversals for 10 ± 3%
of gamble pairs. Subjects also exhibited significantly more strict
P-to-$ reversals, choosing the P-bet both times and bidding higher
on the $-bet, than strict $-to-P reversals, choosing the $-bet both
times and bidding higher on the P-bet, F (1, 23) = 53.30, p < 0.001.
Subjects made strict P-to-$ reversals for 37 ± 4% of gamble pairs
and strict $-to-P reversals for less than 1 ± 1% of gamble pairs.
For pairs where the subject chose the P-bet both times, they bid an
average of $10.37 ± 2.35 higher on $-bet.
Preference reversals were also evident by changes in risk aversion, or attribute weighting, in the two tasks. Subjects were
risk-averse, weighting probability more, during choice trials
(αchoice = 0.77, SE = ±0.05). In contrast, subjects were close to
risk-neutral, weighting probability and amount almost equally
during bid trials (αbid = 1.03, SE = ± 0.01; see Figures 2C,D).
A 15

αchoice ’s were significantly smaller than αbid ’s, t (21) = −4.37,
p < 0.001.
EYE-TRACKING RESULTS

For eye-tracking analyses, our main dependent variables were
number of fixations and looking durations. Both of these variables showed strong effects of task context. In each task, subjects
looked more at the preferred gamble type (P-bet in choices, $-bet
in bids) and the more heavily weighted attribute (probability in
choices, amount to win in bids).
Subjects looked at the preferred gamble type more, fixating on P-bets more often during choice trials and $-bets
more often during bid trials (Figure 3). This was evidenced
by a significant interaction between trial type and gamble type for both the number of fixations, F (1, 22) = 44.25,
p < 0.001, and for the duration of fixations, F (1, 22) = 23.53,
p < 0.001, in our between-task analysis. Looking within each
task, subjects made significantly more fixations on P-bets
(mean = 8.73 ± 0.55) than on $-bets (mean = 7.55 ± 0.61) during
choice trials, F (1, 22) = 27.48, p < 0.001. Subjects also spent significantly more time looking at P-bets (mean = 2,229 ± 191 ms)
than at $-bets (mean = 2,050 ± 231 ms) during choice trials,
F (1, 22) = 7.77, p = 0.01. In contrast, during bid trials, subjects
made more fixations on $-bets (mean = 13.60 ± 0.98) than on
P-bets (mean = 12.05 ± 0.93; F (1, 22) = 22.75, p < 0.001) and
spent more time looking at $-bets (mean = 4,213 ± 445 ms)
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Average number of fixations of $-bets and P-bets during choices and bids. (B) Average duration looking at $-bets and P-bets during choices and
bids.
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than at P-bets (mean = 3,727 ± 405 ms; F (1, 22) = 16.68,
p < 0.001).
Fixations of the two attributes, probability and amount, also
differed between choice and bid trials. Subjects were more likely
to look at probabilities during choice and more likely to look
at amounts during bidding (Figure 4). This was evidenced by
a significant attribute by trial type interaction for both number
of fixations, F (1, 22) = 14.13, p < 0.01, and looking durations,
F (1, 22) = 4.29, p < 0.05, in our between-task analysis. Looking within each task, subjects made significantly more fixations
on probability (mean = 4.3 ± 0.32 fixations) than on amount
(mean = 3.9 ± 0.30 fixations) during choice trials, F (1, 22) = 5.57,
p < 0.05. Similarly, subjects spent marginally more time looking at probability (mean = 1,126 ± 122 ms) than at amount
(mean = 1,012 ± 100 ms) during choice trials, F (1, 22) = 4.19,
p = 0.05 [this effect was more reliable when considering both
gambles, instead of just the left gamble: duration on probability = 2,121 ± 233 ms, duration on amount = 1,865 ± 191 ms, F (1,
22) = 5.99, p < 0.05]. In contrast, during bid trials, subjects made
significantly more fixations on amount (mean = 6.74 ± 0.53 fixations) than on probability [mean = 6.06 ± 0.47 fixations; F (1,
22) = 8.12, p < 0.01], and spent marginally more time looking at amount (mean = 2,137 ± 220 ms) than at probability
[mean = 1,832 ± 237 ms; F (1, 22) = 2.97 p < 0.10].
There was further interaction between these effects of gamble type and attribute. Specifically, the interaction between trial

A

type and attribute was greater for $-bets than for P-bets. This
was evidenced by a significant three-way interaction between trial
type, gamble type, and attribute for both fixations, F (1, 22) = 5.43,
p < 0.05, and for looking duration, F (1, 22) = 11.32, p < 0.01, in
our between-task analysis.
We also examined which attribute was fixated on first in choice
and bid trials. First fixations were more likely to be on probability
than on amount across both kinds of trials (mean first fixation on
probability = 59 ± 13%; F (1, 22) = 9.70, p < 0.01 in our betweentask analysis). Looking within each task, probability was more
likely to be fixated on first in both choice trials, F (1, 22) = 11.06,
p < 0.01, and in bid trials, F (1, 22) = 4.62, p < 0.05. This was qualified by a significant interaction between attribute and trial type
[F (1, 22) = 5.88, p < 0.05], with probability more likely to be fixated on first in choice trials (62 ± 5% in choice trials vs. 55 ± 8%
in bid trials). This interaction, however, was not reliable when we
included both choice options (all four ROIs) in the analysis, rather
than restricting our analysis to only the left choice option [F (1,
22) = 1.27, p > 0.10]. The two-way interaction between attribute
and trial type was further qualified by a three-way interaction
between attribute, trial type, and attribute order, F (1, 22) = 52.32,
p < 0.001, in our between-task analysis. This interaction arose
because during bid trials, subjects primarily fixated on the top
attribute first (mean = 88 ± 3% of first fixations), regardless of
whether it was probability or amount. Subjects fixated on the top
attribute first to a lesser degree during choice trials (67 ± 5% of
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Average number of fixations of probabilities and amounts during choices and bids. (B) Average duration looking at probabilities and amounts
during choices and bids.
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first fixations). Thus it appears attribute placement had a stronger
effect on first fixations than attribute identity.
Finally, we tested for any effects of individual differences by
examining the correlations between the eye-tracking measures and
behavioral measures. Only two of these correlations were statistically significant. Individuals who fixated on the P-bet more during
choice (evaluated using either fixations or looking duration) were
more risk-averse, rs = −0.66 and −0.61, ps < 0.01, respectively.
Note these correlations remained significant even when using a
Bonferroni correction for the number of correlations examined.

DISCUSSION
Here we replicated the preference reversal phenomenon in decision making under risk, in which people facing two gambles of
equal EV choose the one with the higher probability of winning,
but assign a higher price to the one with the larger potential payoff.
We have additionally shown that preference reversals are accompanied by changes in visual fixations. Participants had more fixations
on the preferred gamble in each task (P-bets in choices, $-bets in
bids). They also had more fixations on the more heavily weighted
attribute in each task (probability in choices, amounts in bids).
These results show that visual fixations reflect preferences in decision making under risk, as they do in decisions about goods (Krajbich et al., 2009, 2010), and that fixations further reflect attribute
weights in a multi-attribute choice paradigm. These results support a contingent weighting explanation of preference reversals,
and also suggest testable hypotheses about the neural mechanisms
of preference reversals.
Behaviorally, we replicated the classic preference reversal finding. Our participants predominantly chose the high-probability
bet from a pair of gambles matched in EV, and predominantly
assigned higher prices to the (alternative) bet that offered the
larger amount to win. For 37% of gamble pairs, our participants
made strict P-to-$ reversals, choosing the P-bet twice and bidding
higher on the $-bet. Consistent with this, participants were overall
risk-averse during choices, and very slightly risk-seeking during
bids.
One novel aspect of our paradigm compared to previous work
is the highly repeated nature of the trials. Participants made 100
choices and 100 bids over the course of the experiment. Our results
demonstrate that preference reversals are not eliminated when
subjects are tested with many repeated trials. Our design does not
allow us to test whether they are diminished by repeated trials,
though the effects we observed in this experiment are of similar
size to those reported in the literature. Most neuroscientific methods require many repeated trials and within-subject comparisons.
While many context effects are eliminated under these conditions,
our results show that preference reversals are not, and therefore
may be a good paradigm for neuroscientific studies of context
effects.
Despite only having to assess the value of one gamble, participants took longer to make bids than to make choices. Although
it is possible that the difference in response times might be due
to differences in response entry, it is unlikely that pressing one
or two more buttons accounts for an increase of more than 2 s.
Spending more time deciding on a bid than choosing between two
options is consistent with previous findings (Johnson et al., 1988;
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Schkade and Johnson, 1988). It suggests that the decision process
for assigning prices is potentially more complex than that required
for binary choices. This is consistent with models that assume that
binary choice is the more basic process (Johnson and Busemeyer,
2005), but not with models that assume pricing is more basic (Luce
et al., 1993). Pricing and matching tasks have rarely been studied
in decision neuroscience (though see Plassmann et al., 2007) so
an interesting question for future research is the degree to which
choice and bidding rely on shared vs. distinct neural processes.
Recent work has found that fixations reflect trial-to-trial variability in preferences (Krajbich et al., 2009, 2010). Our findings
extend this principle to decision making under risk. During
choices, participants made more fixations on the preferred gamble type in that task, P-bets, and spent a greater amount of time
looking at P-bets. During bids, participants made more fixations
on the preferred gamble type in that task, $-bets, and spent a
greater amount of time looking at $-bets. We acknowledge that
the bidding results are confounded by a longer reaction time for
$-bets than for P-bets, making this finding more difficult to interpret. There is not such a confound in the choice results, however,
which clearly replicate the link between fixations and preferences
observed in other choice domains.
Our key finding, though, was that preference reversals were
associated with changes in visual fixations to the two gamble attributes in the two tasks. During bidding, participants made more
fixations on amounts and spent a greater amount of time looking
at amounts. During choices, participants made a greater number
of fixations on probabilities and spent a greater amount of time
looking at probabilities.
The directionality of these results is broadly consistent with the
contingent weighting hypothesis. According to this hypothesis,
preference reversals result from an increased weight on probability in value computations during choice, and a corresponding
increased weight on amount during bids. We found that people
fixate probabilities more during choice and amounts more during
bids.
These differences in fixations might only be an index of the
differential weighting of attributes, or alternatively might also be
a cause of this differential weighting. This latter possibility raises
several ideas for future research that would involve exogenously
controlling fixations. If fixations influence attribute weighting,
then preference reversals might be reduced, or even eliminated,
when participants are forced to look equally at probabilities
and amounts. In addition, forcing more fixations to the weaker
attribute of an option might make people less likely to choose that
option, a potential exception to previous work showing that fixating on an option makes people more likely to choose it (Armel
et al., 2008).
However, a simple model in which preference reversals are due
solely to changes in attribute weights, and fixations provide an
unbiased index of these weights, has trouble completely accounting for our data. As shown in Figure 2D, participants’ decisions
reflect nearly equal weighting of probability and amount during bids (i.e., participants are close to risk-neutral), and a greater
weighting of probability during choices (i.e., participants are riskaverse). In contrast, as shown in Figure 4, participants fixate
probabilities more during choices and amounts more during bids.
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One possible resolution is that people are intrinsically riskaverse, weighting probabilities more, and only changes from that
intrinsic baseline are reflected in changes from equal fixation
of the two attributes. Another possibility is that fixations are
monotonically, but not linearly, related to attribute weights. While
participants are close to risk-neutral during bids, they are still significantly risk-seeking, and they also fixate amounts more than
probabilities. A final possibility, of course, is that fixations and
looking times reflect more than attribute weights alone. For example, first fixations showed a strong effect of the spatial position
of attributes, and other influences could have shifted fixations
similarly in both choices and bids.
Our findings are similar to those reported previously by Johnson et al. (1988) and Lohse and Johnson (1996). Using Mouselab,
those authors found that subjects attended to amounts more, and
probabilities less, during bids than during choices (for example,
56 vs. 51% of the time in Experiment 1 of Schkade and Johnson,
1988). This same overall pattern was arguably more dramatic in
our fixation data. This points to a potential difference in sensitivity between the two techniques, which might arise from how
people process information differently in the two environments.
In the Mouselab environment, only one piece of information is
available at any one time. Johnson et al. noted that in their experiments some subjects used a strategy of first looking at all of the
information sequentially, and then holding it in mind while they
made their decision. Under free viewing, subjects do not adopt this
strategy at all. Of the total fixations in Figure 3, 3.59 ± 0.28 fixations during choice trials are made when returning to an item after
fixating on it once and then looking elsewhere, while 5.40 ± 0.42
represent return fixations during bidding.
Our data on individual differences provide additional support
for the notion that fixations reflect preferences during choices.
Individuals who fixated more on the P-bet during choice trials
were more risk-averse. However, we did not find any other significant correlations between individual differences in eye movements
and behavioral measures. A possible reason for these null findings
is that we have a small sample size for evaluating individual differences. Additionally, most participants show a robust preference
reversal effect, so there is limited variability in the number of
preference reversals. Future research could further explore how
individual differences in fixations related to individual differences in preference reversals, perhaps using a larger sample or
a paradigm in which there is greater variance in the behavioral
effect.
Future research could also investigate how different presentation formats affect eye fixations and, in turn, preference reversals.
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